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PROHIBITING CASHLESS RETAILERS AND 
PROTECTING THE IMPOVERISHED 
Allison Kretovic 
ABSTRACT 
A growing number of customer-facing businesses have opted to 
implement cashless policies, declining to accept cash for payment 
and limiting consumers’ options on how they can pay for goods and 
services. Proponents for cashless policies cite the efficiencies gained 
by removing cash from a business and concerns about theft as their 
primary reasons for supporting such policies. Opponents to the move 
toward cashless express concerns that the policy is discriminatory 
and has a disparate impact on lower-income consumers who do not 
have access to financial institutions. Policymakers at the local and 
state levels have responded by proposing and enacting legislation 
prohibiting discrimination against cash buyers. 
This Note examines the controversy regarding cashless policies 
and the appropriate government response to this practice. This Note 
argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should classify poverty as a 
suspect class and apply strict scrutiny to any legislation that impacts 
a low-income person’s ability to participate in the marketplace 
freely. Additionally, this Note argues that Congress should enact 
federal legislation to prohibit businesses from implementing cashless 
policies because the policies discriminate against those who do not 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 10, 2019, Mercedes-Benz Stadium, home of Major 
League Soccer’s (MLS) Atlanta United FC and the National Football 
League’s (NFL) Atlanta Falcons, went completely cashless, 
becoming the first MLS or NFL stadium to do so.1 And it is not 
alone. Across the country, a growing number of customer-facing 
businesses have opted to go cashless, declining to accept dollar bills 
and coins for payment and limiting consumers’ options on how they 
can pay for goods and services.2 Although the majority of stores and 
restaurants around the United States still accept cash, some experts 
estimate that in five years, a third of all retailers will be cashless, up 
from about 17% in 2019.3 About 10% of brick-and-mortar stores will 
be cashless in five years, up from less than 1% in 2019.4 
Businesses point to their freedom of choice and the efficiency 
gained by removing cash from the establishment as justifications for 
opting to go cashless.5 By eliminating the time spent counting 
money, a company can serve customers faster.6 Many businesses no 
 
 1. Simon Ogus, Mercedes-Benz Stadium Will Become First Pro Sports Venue to Go Cashless, 
FORBES (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonogus/2019/03/07/mercedes-benz-
stadium-will-become-first-pro-sports-venue-to-go-cashless/#70d1ab8f366a [https://perma.cc/2JXN-
S8HH]; Tim Tucker, Mercedes-Benz Stadium Will Convert to Cashless Operation, ATLANTA J.-CONST. 
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/sports/mercedes-benz-stadium-will-convert-cashless-
operation/7GdA0UNpqYUrB5b4dpdNZI/ [https://perma.cc/LX97-5U7S] (“The change follows 
extensive testing last year . . . . Stadium-wide, the percentage of customers using cash dropped from 42 
percent at the start of the Falcons season to 30 percent at the end . . . . Cash usage has been lower at 
Atlanta United games than Falcons games . . . .”). 
 2. CLAIRE WANG, CASH PROD. OFF. FED. RSRV. SYS., CASH ME IF YOU CAN: THE IMPACTS OF 
CASHLESS BUSINESSES ON RETAILERS, CONSUMERS, AND CASH USE 3 (2019), 
https://www.frbsf.org/cash/files/Cash-Me-If-You-Can-August2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9V8-NJK8] 
(“In recent years, numerous businesses have made headlines for refusing to accept cash as a form of 
payment. These businesses span a variety of industries, including airlines, eateries, sports stadiums, and 
general merchandise stores. This phenomenon is not just limited to a few cities, either. Cashless 
businesses have popped up across the country, including places like New York, Atlanta, and Chicago.”). 
 3. Olga Kharif & Krista Gmelich, As Amazon Leads Cashless Charge, States and Cities Push Back, 
BLOOMBERGQUINT, https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/who-is-banning-cashless-stores-amazon-
go-could-be-next [https://perma.cc/F6NR-VKTF] (Mar. 30, 2019, 10:36 AM). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Wang, supra note 2, at 5 (“Particularly in high-volume businesses, these faster transaction times 
can translate to increased customer satisfaction, fewer opportunities for error in making change, and 
increased revenue.”). 
 6. Id. (“Counting cash can take time, both for the customer and the employee. Several businesses 
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longer accept hard currency because handling cash can add as much 
as 10% to overhead costs.7 Safety, particularly minimizing the risk of 
theft or robbery, is also a top reason a business cites when making the 
switch.8  
Credit card companies and banks are proponents of the move 
towards a cashless economy and view cash as a competitor.9 In 2017, 
Visa ran a promotion, the Visa Cashless Challenge, awarding fifty 
eligible businesses in the U.S. up to $10,000 if they committed to 
going cashless.10 Proponents of cashless retailers claim that a ban on 
the refusal to accept cash stifles innovation and inhibits growth.11 
On the other hand, opponents to cashless retailers point out that the 
policy is discriminatory and impacts lower-income consumers who 
do not have access to financial institutions.12 Many financial 
 
that have gone cashless have cited benefits like faster transactions and increased store throughput.”). 
 7. Kharif & Gmelich, supra note 3; Wang, supra note 2, at 4 (“Small- and medium-sized 
businesses are reported to pay tens of billions of dollars annually on cash handling expenses. 
Eliminating cash payments eliminates the costs associated with handling and transporting cash.”). 
 8. Wang, supra note 2, at 4 (“Not having cash on store premises also reduces opportunities for both 
internal and external robberies. . . . Externally, cash-intensive businesses can be targets for robberies. 
Nearly a quarter of U.S. robberies (26 percent) took place at some type of retailer—either a gas station, 
convenience store, or other commercial residence . . . . When businesses forego cash on their premises, 
there may be fewer opportunities and incentives for internal and external theft.”). 
 9. Rey Mashayekhi, Bank of America CEO: ‘We Want a Cashless Society,’ FORTUNE FIN., at 10:34 
(June 19, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/06/19/bank-of-america-ceo-cashless 
[https://perma.cc/XQ9R-9QYQ] (“We want a cashless society. It costs us $5 billion for checks and cash 
to move around our company. . . . We have more to gain than anybody in the sense from a pure 
operating costs [perspective].” (quoting Bank of America CEO, Brian Moynihan)); Emily Bary, Visa’s 
Plan to Vanquish Its ‘Biggest Competitor,’ BARRON’S (July 18, 2017, 8:49 AM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/visas-plan-to-vanquish-its-biggest-competitor-1500382183 
[https://perma.cc/YZ32-RVU4] (“Visa benefits considerably as consumers skip trips to the ATM. ‘Our 
biggest competitor is cash,’ Avin Arumugam, Visa’s head of ‘Internet of Things’ efforts . . . told us.”). 
 10. Visa to Help U.S. Small Businesses Go Cashless, VISA (July 12, 2017), 
https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/newsroom/press-releases.releaseId.2285993.html 
[https://perma.cc/GF9F-8K23] (“Aiming to create a culture where cash is no longer king . . . Visa will 
be awarding up to $500,000 to [fifty] eligible [U.S.]-based small business food service owners who 
commit to joining the 100% cashless quest.”). 
 11. Rebeca Ibarra, New Jersey Bans Cashless Stores, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/new-jersey-bans-cashless-retailers [https://perma.cc/B23M-RUHN] 
(“‘Consumers of all income levels are able to access prepaid cards for purchasing.’ Michael Wallace, 
vice president of government affairs for the New Jersey Business and Industry Association, said in a 
statement. ‘As such, this law will ultimately stifle innovation and act as a further deterrent to doing 
business in New Jersey.’”). 
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institutions require customers to maintain minimum account 
balances, charge monthly fees, or impose penalties for overdrafting 
an account.13 These types of policies make it difficult for low-income 
customers to maintain bank accounts.14 Banks lack incentives to 
provide options for low-income customers.15 Regulatory efforts 
aimed at compelling banks to meet the needs of the poor have largely 
failed.16 
Other opponents cite the loss of privacy when consumers are 
forced to use a credit card to make a purchase.17 The use of electronic 
transfers or debit and credit cards for “transactions allow banks, 
stores, and app providers to track a person’s habits and can expose 
users to fraud.”18 Additionally, as consumers increase the frequency 
of their noncash transactions, their vulnerability to cyberattacks 
intensifies.19 Several of the most significant cyberattacks targeted 
 
[https://perma.cc/VFW2-G4F9] (“The strongest objection relates to the ways in which rejecting physical 
currency plays out as a bias toward the poor, advancing segregation in retail environments.”); Nick 
Bourke et al., Rise of Cashless Retailers Problematic for Some Consumers, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. 
(Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/11/08/rise-of-
cashless-retailers-problematic-for-some-consumers [https://perma.cc/89LS-5DQN] (“[Twenty-three] 
percent of households with incomes under $50,000 say they primarily pay with cash compared with just 
10 percent of households earning $50,000 or more per year.”). 
 13. Nadra Nittle, Why Cashless Retailers Put Low-Income People at Even More of a Disadvantage, 
VOX (Nov. 30, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://vox.com/the-goods/2018/11/30/18119887/cashless-stores-cash-
only-low-income-disadvantage [https://perma.cc/E2R5-RWJM]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE 
THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 152–53 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2015) (“Most policymakers and scholars have 
given up trying to force banks to meet the needs of the poor, claiming the cost considerations simply 
prevent banks from operating in this market.”). 
 16. Id. (“Banking regulators have tried numerous times to induce mainstream banks to provide small 
loans to the poor, but . . . these attempts have failed.”). 
 17. Hannah H. Kim, The Future of Cash: Will Digital Payment Systems Replace Paper Currency?, 
CQ RESEARCHER (July 19, 2019), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2019071900 
[https://perma.cc/HA6Y-QSH3] (“While digital payment methods create transaction records for each 
user, cash can be anonymous, providing a measure of privacy to the purchaser. Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) rules require a cash transaction to be reported only when it exceeds $10,000. Cash is also 
essentially untraceable.”). 
 18. Anna Kramer, NYC Pushing Ahead with Cashless Retail Ban, Joining Neighbors, BLOOMBERG 
L. (June 10, 2019, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/nyc-pushing-
ahead-with-cashless-retail-ban-joining-neighbors [https://perma.cc/QB5F-LS4R]. 
 19. Kim, supra note 17 (“[A]ttacks on financial service firms are more frequent than in other 
industries[] and increased by more than 70 percent worldwide in 2017 over the previous year . . . .”). 
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databases that store sensitive personal and financial information.20 
When compromised, personal and financial information can be used 
for identity theft and fraud.21 
In response to the rise in the number of cashless retailers, several 
state and local legislators enacted bills requiring retailers to accept 
cash as a form of payment.22 This Note discusses the controversy 
regarding cashless policies and the appropriate government response 
to this practice. Part I examines current and proposed legislation 
aimed at addressing the cashless retailer trend and the arguments for 
and against cashless policies. Part II analyzes the two primary 
methods of challenging cashless policies—under the Legal Tender 
Act or under the Equal Protection Clause by treating wealth as a 
suspect classification. Finally, Part III suggests an updated approach 
to the Equal Protection Clause method by making poverty a suspect 
classification and enacting federal legislation to ensure consumers 
who choose to use cash retain their ability to participate in the 
consumer marketplace. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Legislative Efforts 
Massachusetts enacted a bill in 1978 prohibiting discrimination 
against cash buyers.23 Although the law has been on the books for 
over forty years, it has not been actively enforced.24 More recently, 
 
 20. Id. (“One of the largest data breaches was the 2017 hack involving Equifax, the consumer 
reporting agency, in which more than 150 million customer records were stolen, including Social 
Security numbers, birthdates and credit card data.”). 
 21. Tamara Kurtzman, Cashing Out, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2019, at 22, 26 (“In 2017 alone, more than 
1,500 data breaches occurred compromising more than 170 million records, including approximately 14 
million credit card numbers.”). 
 22. Wang, supra note 2. 
 23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 10A (2017) (“No retail establishment offering goods and services 
for sale shall discriminate against a cash buyer by requiring the use of credit by a buyer in order to 
purchase such goods and services. All such retail establishments must accept legal tender when offered 
as payment by the buyer.”). 
 24. Chris Sweeney, Should Boston Stop Using Cash?, BOS. MAG. (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:44 AM), 
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2018/02/06/cashless-boston [https://perma.cc/8JFR-CVGG] 
(“Today, the law is a rat’s nest of red tape in which oversight and enforcement is shared between the 
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Rhode Island and New Jersey passed similar legislation.25 Oregon 
and Connecticut have proposed legislation aimed at prohibiting 
cashless businesses.26 Cities like New York City, San Francisco, and 
Philadelphia have also passed ordinances restricting the practice.27 
Other cities, such as St. Louis and the District of Columbia, have 
proposed (and even enacted) bills aimed at limiting retailers’ abilities 
to reject cash payments.28 New York City Councilman Ritchie 
Torres, who introduced the NYC legislation, explained: 
It is bad enough that the poor are already so stigmatized, 
and now we are stigmatizing them even further for the way 
they consume goods and services . . . . I talk a lot about 
effective discrimination. But this amounts to intentional 
discrimination, because these businesses that don’t accept 
cash know exactly who they are keeping out.29 
Not all proposals have been successful, though—Chicago’s city 
council declined to pass proposed legislation outlawing cashless 
retailers.30 
 
Attorney General’s Office and the Division of Banks at the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business 
Regulation—and it doesn’t seem to be actively enforced. The AG’s office . . . has received only six 
complaints about cashless businesses since 2013 and has taken no enforcement actions.”); Cristina 
Quinn, As Society Becomes Increasingly Cashless, Is Massachusetts Ready?, WGHB (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.wgbh.org/news/2018/02/13/news/society-becomes-increasingly-cashless-massachusetts-
ready [https://perma.cc/HPG5-DNGP] (“It may be somewhat ambiguous whether a restaurant 
qualifies . . . . [I]t’s incumbent upon the Legislature to give us some guidance here so that we all know 
whether restaurants must abide by these regulations in the era of the cashless economy. It’s up to the 
Legislature to handle this and create a uniform interpretation of ‘retail establishment.’” (quoting 
Northeaster University law professor Daniel Medwed)). In 2019, several lawmakers in Massachusetts 
proposed legislation to repeal the prohibition against cashless retailers. S.B. 181, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 
2019). In February of 2020, the bill accompanied a study order, authorizing the Joint Committee on 
Consumer Protection and Professional Licensure to make an investigation and study of proposed Senate 
bills related to consumer protection. S.B. Order No. 2534, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2020). 
 25. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-30 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33 (West 2019). 
 26. S.B. 716, 80th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); H.B. 5703, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 
(Conn. 2019).  
 27. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-840 (2019); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1132 (2019); S.F., CAL., 
POLICE CODE art. 55, §§ 5500–06 (2019). 
 28. St. Louis, Mo., Proposed Ordinance 47 (May 23, 2019); D.C. CODE §§ 28-5401–5404 (2021). 
 29. Bellafante, supra note 12. 
 30. Chicago, Ill., Proposed Ordinance 7145 (Oct. 11, 2017). 
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While the Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes include an 
outright ban on cashless retailers, most municipal and state laws have 
included exceptions in their bills.31 Most of the bills make exceptions 
for online retailers and those that are completing transactions over the 
telephone or through the mail.32 Other exceptions include airport 
vendors, car rental facilities, and parking garages—sectors where 
cash purchases are not possible or where cards act as a form of 
collateral.33 
Currently, no federal statute mandates that a private business, 
individual persons, or organizations must accept cash payment for 
goods or services.34 The Coinage Act of 1965 states: “United States 
coins and currency . . . are legal tender for all debts, public charges, 
taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for 
debts.”35 The Act, however, does not require businesses to accept 
cash for goods and services.36 Private businesses can choose whether 
to accept cash unless there is a state law that prohibits cashless 
policies.37 At the same time, courts have upheld state and local 
governments’ authority to require payment for government-provided 
services in certain forms.38 
 
 31. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 10A (2017), and 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-30 (2019) 
(prohibiting any retail establishment from discriminating against a cash buyer by requiring the use of 
credit), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33 (West 2019) (prohibiting a seller from requiring a buyer to use 
credit, but providing exemptions for retailers located at an airport, certain parking facilities, rental car 
companies, and certain sports and entertainment venues). 
 32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33(d) (“As used in this section, ‘at retail’ shall include any retail 
transaction conducted in person and exclude any telephone, mail, or Internet-based transaction.”). 
 33. Kramer, supra note 18. 
 34. Legal Tender Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Currency/Pages/legal-tender.aspx (Jan. 4, 2011, 4:47 PM). 
 35. Coinage Act of 1965, 31 U.S.C. § 5103; see also Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 553 (1870), 
abrogation recognized by Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002). 
 36. Legal Tender Status, supra note 34. 
 37. Id. (“Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether or not to accept cash 
unless there is a State law which says otherwise. For example, a bus line may prohibit payment of fares 
in pennies or dollar bills. In addition, movie theaters, convenience stores and gas stations may refuse to 
accept large denomination currency (usually notes above $20) as a matter of policy.”). 
 38. Genesee Scrap & Tin Baling Co. v. City of Rochester, 558 F. Supp. 2d 432, 434, 436–37 
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (upholding city ordinance requiring junkyard operators to use checks for purchases 
because the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s police power). 
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B. Equal Protection Challenge 
Cashless practices may raise constitutional concerns of 
discrimination against the poor.39 Under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, “no State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”40 The Equal 
Protection Clause applies only to state and local action, but current 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent does not require the state to treat 
people equally—it only requires the government to justify any 
classification with a sufficient rationale.41 The Supreme Court has 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment extends 
analogous equal protection requirements to the federal government.42 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s deference to a governmental 
classification within a law depends on the interest at stake.43 There 
are typically two types of classifications: facially discriminatory 
classifications and facially neutral classifications.44 Facially 
discriminatory classifications are found directly in the text of the law 
and are challenged by showing that the law is unconstitutional in all 
of its applications.45 Facially neutral classifications may have a 
discriminatory impact either from the law or from its 
administration.46 If a law is facially neutral, demonstrating a 
 
 39. Kim, supra note 17 (“New Jersey Assemblyman Paul Moriarty, who supported his state’s law, 
said he did so because ‘a ban on cash is discriminatory. It marginalizes the poor, marginalizes young 
people who haven’t established credit yet.’”). 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 41. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That 
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”); 
Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135 (2011). 
 42. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[T]he concepts of equal protection and due 
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of 
law’ . . . .”). 
 43. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 725 (6th ed. 2019) 
(“Many government laws draw a distinction among people and thus are potentially susceptible to an 
equal protection challenge.”); Strauss, supra note 41 (“In most cases of unequal treatment under law, 
courts simply defer to the legislative judgment that the distinction is rational; only in certain unusual 
circumstances will the courts subject the government’s classifications to more rigorous examination.”). 
 44. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 727. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 726. 
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potentially improper classification requires proof that there is some 
discriminatory purpose behind the law.47 
Discrimination based on suspect classifications (such as race or 
national origin) is subject to a strict scrutiny test.48 Under the strict 
scrutiny test, the government interest must be compelling, and the 
classification must be necessary or narrowly tailored to the 
government interest.49 Intermediate scrutiny applies to semi-suspect 
or quasi-suspect classifications like gender.50 In intermediate 
scrutiny, the government interest must be important, and the means 
must be substantially related to meet the ends.51 All other legislative 
actions that do not involve a suspect or semi-suspect classification 
are subject to a rational basis review—the minimum level of scrutiny, 
which requires that there be a legitimate government interest and that 
the means be rationally related to meet the ends.52 
Unless a person is seeking to exercise a fundamental right, such as 
voting or seeking to place their name on a ballot, wealth 
classifications are traditionally subject to a rational basis review.53 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that poverty is not a suspect 
classification and that discrimination against the poor should only 
receive a rational basis review.54 
 
 47. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976) (“[D]isproportionate impact, standing alone and 
without regard to whether it indicated a discriminatory purpose, was held sufficient to establish a 
constitutional violation . . . .”); id. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the 
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”). 
 48. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 727. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Strauss, supra note 41, at 137. 
 51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 727; Strauss, supra note 41, at 137 (“[L]aws that affect a 
‘quasi-suspect class’ receive intermediate scrutiny review. Such laws are upheld if the classification is 
substantially related to an important government purpose. Striking down laws under an intermediate 
level of scrutiny is difficult but not insurmountable.”). 
 52. Strauss, supra note 41, at 136. 
 53. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding a poll tax violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because wealth was not relevant to one’s ability to participate intelligently in 
the electoral process); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1972) (finding excessive ballot fees 
violated the Equal Protection Clause in part because the effect of the exclusionary mechanism’s 
limitation would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community). 
 54. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (“The system of alleged 
discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not 
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
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C. Proposed Federal Legislation 
As long as poverty remains a non-suspect classification, 
addressing no-cash policies at a national level would require 
legislation. In May of 2019, Congress considered two bills designed 
to limit or outright prohibit cashless retailers.55 The first, the Cash 
Always Should Be Honored Act (CASH Act), proposed that the 
practice of operating a cashless business would be considered a 
violation of section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.56 The second proposal, the Payment Choice Act of 2019 
(Payment Choice Act), allowed a party to commence a civil action 
for preventive relief, including pursuing an application for a 
permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order against such 
persons.57 The Payment Choice Act also allowed for intervention by 
the Attorney General.58 
Both bills cited Congress’s authority to regulate the practice of 
cash retail pursuant to Article I, Section Eight, Clause Three of the 
Constitution, the Commerce Clause.59 The Commerce Clause gives 
Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”60 Under the 
Commerce Clause power, Congress can regulate intrastate activities 
if there is a rational basis for believing that there is an interstate 
effect.61 
 
majoritarian political process. . . . [T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination 
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 55. H.R. 2630, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2650, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 56. H.R. 2630 § 2(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any physical retail establishment to refuse to accept 
legal tender as payment for any products or services offered for sale by such physical retail 
establishment.”). 
 57. H.R. 2650 § 3(a) (“No person selling or offering goods or services at retail to the public may—
(1) refuse to accept United States legal tender of cash as payment for goods or services; (2) post signs or 
notices in, on, or about the business premises of such person stating that cash payment is not accepted; 
or (3) charge a higher price to any customer who pays by cash than customarily is charged to a customer 
using other forms of payment.”). 
 58. Id. (“Upon timely application, a court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to 
intervene in a civil action brought under this subsection, if the Attorney General certifies that the action 
is of general public importance.”). 
 59. See H.R. 2630; H.R. 2650. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 61. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 277. 
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In deciding whether to act, the government balances competing 
goals when examining the viability and constitutionality of a future 
cashless society.62 On the one hand, the risk and frequency of 
cyberattacks increase as society moves cashless.63 On the other, 
electronic payments allow the government to track the flow of money 
and increase tax collection.64 Understatement of the amount of taxes 
owed by businesses contributes to the federal tax gap—the difference 
between what taxpayers owe and what they pay.65 A 10% increase in 
the adoption of digital money would result in a $150 billion boost to 
consumer spending.66 An increase in payment digitization could net 
the government more than $100 billion in incremental taxes.67 
Restricting the use of cash may also reduce the prevalence of money 
laundering and other financial crimes.68 
Cash critics say the rising demand for $100 bills but simultaneous 
decline in the average number of cash consumer purchases points to 
the use of cash in facilitating illegal activities such as money 
 
 62. The Future of Money: Coins and Bank Notes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Pol’y 
and Trade of the H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 5 (2018) [hereinafter The Future of Money 
Hearings]. 
 63. Id. (statement of Leonard Olijar, Director of the United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing) 
(“[A] cashless society presents a significant economic risk and neglects to serve those who do not have 
access to smartphones, computers, banks, and credit. I believe the 21st century warfare has a significant 
cyber component . . . . If your enemy is able to take down your electronic infrastructure or a natural 
disaster hits, there will be no way to conduct commerce in a cashless environment, crippling the 
economy.”). 
 64. Jennifer Surane, Digital Payments’ $95 Trillion Tide Undaunted by Cash Holdouts, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-03-
29/cashless-backlash-in-u-s-fails-to-dent-a-95-trillion-industry [https://perma.cc/ST2Y-2HBU]. 
 65. Jeremy Temkin, Tax Gap Estimates Show That Compliance Rates Remain Unchanged, FORBES 
(Oct. 18, 2019, 9:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2019/10/18/tax-gap-estimates-show-
that-compliance-rates-remain-unchanged/#66bf870f5edd [https://perma.cc/U9TZ-D9WP] (“[T]he IRS 
attributes the vast majority of the tax gap to taxpayers who understate the amount of taxes they owe on 
timely filed returns ($352 billion), followed by taxpayers who file returns but do not pay their taxes on 
time ($50 billion) and non-filers who do not pay their taxes on time ($39 billion).”); Susan Cleary Morse 
et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 37 (2009) (“Underpayment of 
tax on business income is commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”). 
 66. Surane, supra note 64. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Kurtzman, supra note 21, at 22; Kim, supra note 17 (“Cash serves another purpose: it is the 
medium of choice for illicit activities. This helps explain two seemingly contradictory trends: a steady 
increase in the demand for U.S. dollars, most notably the $100 bill, even as the average value of 
consumer purchases made in cash declines.”). 
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laundering, tax evasion, and the purchase of illegal goods.69 
Additionally, the government must consider the cost of producing 
coinage.70 Since 2006, the cost of creating pennies and nickels has 
exceeded their worth.71 
However, the government also has a potential competing interest 
in ensuring financial inclusion.72 Some have argued that legislators 
should update the Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) mission to mandate 
that the Fed promote efficiency and financial inclusion to benefit 
more Americans rather than forcing Americans to work with the Fed 
through a bank.73 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), in 2017, 6.5% of U.S. households were 
“unbanked,” meaning no one in the household had a checking or 
savings account, and 18.7% of U.S. households were “underbanked,” 
meaning a household had an account at an insured institution but also 
obtained financial products outside of the banking system.74 The 
 
 69. Kim, supra note 17 (“In 2017, the $100 bill became the most widely circulated note in 
circulation, even exceeding the $1 bill. . . . Cash critics say the rising demand for $100 bills is directly 
tied to paper currency’s utility for activities such as money laundering, tax evasion and purchases of 
illegal goods.”); KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH 60 (2016) (“By far the most important area 
of tax noncompliance comes from underreporting of business income by individuals who conduct a 
significant share of their transactions in cash. . . . Overall, small business owners report less than half 
their income and account for 52% of the tax gap.”). 
 70. The Future of Money Hearings, supra note 62, at 2. 
 71. Id. at 108 (“The cost of producing a penny has varied from about $0.014 per unit in 2006 to 
$0.025 per unit in 2011.”). 
 72. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20160610_financial_inclusion_ce
a_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY6X-T9J6] (“A lack of financial inclusion has broader 
consequences for the macroeconomy, having the potential to hurt both equity and efficiency by reducing 
access to credit, which can be essential for entrepreneurship, homeownership, and economic 
development more broadly.”). 
 73. Examining Regul. Frameworks for Digit. Currencies and Blockchain: Hearing Before S. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (testimony of Mehrsa Baradaran, Professor of 
Law, University of California Irvine School of Law); E. Kylie Norman, Banking at the Fed with 
FedAccounts: The Demise of Commercial Banks?, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 451, 452 (2019) (“To include 
this underserved population, there is a current proposal . . . to let all individuals have access to bank 
accounts at the Federal Reserve. . . . The FedAccounts proposal seeks to make holding a deposit account 
with the central bank—currently limited only to banking institutions—available to individuals and 
nonbank businesses.”). 
 74. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017: FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2018). 
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most common reason cited for being unbanked was that households 
do not have enough money to keep in their accounts.75 
Unbanked families face disproportionately higher costs in financial 
transactions and spend almost 10% of their income on financial 
transactions alone—more than many of these families spend on 
food.76 Many lower-income people find themselves living in banking 
deserts, meaning there are no banks in a travelable distance around 
them.77 Residents of banking deserts may still have access to 
alternative “fringe” providers of financial services such as 
check-cashing firms, pawnshops, and payday loan stores.78 In 
addition, the homeless population is especially vulnerable in a 
cashless society.79 Many banks require identification and sometimes 
a secondary proof of identification such as a utility bill to open an 
account.80 
 
 75. Id. at 4; Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REGUL. 121, 136 (2004) 
(“Low-income households face key barriers to increased saving, and their low income leaves them little 
opportunity to save. . . . [T]hey face higher opportunity costs for putting their funds toward savings 
rather than current consumption.”). 
 76. BARADARAN, supra note 15, at 139 (“[T]he average unbanked family with an annual income of 
around $25,000 spends about $2,400 per year, almost 10 percent of its income, on financial transactions. 
This is more money than these families spend on food.”). 
 77. Donald P. Morgan et al., Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information, FED. RSRV. 
BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/banking-deserts-branch-closings-and-soft-
information.html [https://perma.cc/NS8B-YDU5] (“[W]e define a banking desert as a census tract—a 
relatively homogeneous area or neighborhood containing about 4,000 people—with no branches within 
ten miles of the center of the tract . . . .”). 
 78. Id.; MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH 
GAP 260 (2017) (“Most black neighborhoods are ‘banking deserts,’ neighborhoods abandoned by 
mainstream banks. . . . When banks leave a neighborhood, the sharks usually fill the void. Banking 
deserts are left vulnerable to high-cost payday lenders, title lenders, and other fringe banks.”). 
 79. Kharif & Gmelich, supra note 3; Jay Stanley, Say No to the “Cashless Future” — and to 
Cashless Stores, ACLU (Aug. 12, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/consumer-privacy/say-no-cashless-future-and-cashless-stores [https://perma.cc/U97K-
MFYR] (“Opening a bank account requires an ID, which many poor and elderly people lack, as well as 
other documents such as a utility bill or other proof of address, which the homeless lack, and which 
generally create bureaucratic barriers to participating in electronic payment networks.”). 
 80. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2020). A bank “must implement a written Customer Identification 
Program (CIP).” Id. If a bank is using a non-documentary method to verify a customer’s identity, its CIP 
must contain procedures describing the non-documentary methods the bank will use, such as “contacting 
a customer; independently verifying the customer’s identity through the comparison of information 
provided by the customer with information obtained from a consumer reporting agency, public database, 
or other source; checking references with other financial institutions; and obtaining a financial 
statement.” Id. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
There are several avenues that challengers to cashless policies and 
similar legislation have used to object to the practice. First, 
opponents to cashless policies cite the Coinage Act of 1965 in 
arguing that legal tender should be accepted for all debts incurred.81 
Second, plaintiffs have cited the Equal Protection Clause as a 
constitutional basis for challenging cash discrimination because it 
disproportionately impacts the unbanked and underbanked. 
A. Legal Tender 
Critics to the cashless movement point to the language printed on 
U.S. currency—“legal tender for all debts, public and private”—to 
justify their argument that cash should always be accepted.82 Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “legal tender” as the money (bills and coins) 
approved in a country for the payment of debts, the purchase of 
goods, and other exchanges for value.83 In the United States, “coins 
and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes 
of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all 
debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”84 Although critics opposed to 
cashless policies frequently cite the legal tender rule, the rule does 
not require an establishment to accept cash as a form of payment.85 
From a contract law perspective, a person does not incur a debt 
until after they receive a good or service.86 As long as a cashless 
restaurant discloses their cashless policy upfront, the restaurant is 
offering to serve a customer a meal, but they are offering it on their 
 
 81. 31 U.S.C. § 5103. 
 82. Stanley, supra note 79. 
 83. Legal Tender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 84. 31 U.S.C. § 5103. 
 85. Legal Tender Status, supra note 34. 
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terms.87 If a customer consumes the meal, they have accepted the 
terms of the contract.88 
Challenges to cashless policies that employ the Legal Tender Act 
as a basis for the claim have been mostly unsuccessful.89 In Nemser 
v. New York City Transit Authority, bus riders brought a challenge to 
the transit authority’s policy of refusing to accept cash for bus fare.90 
The Supreme Court of New York held that the Legal Tender Act 
“cannot be interpreted to require acceptance of a particular 
denomination of currency . . . for bus fare.”91 
Similarly, in Rosen v. Continental Airlines, Inc., an airline 
passenger challenged Continental’s “cashless cabin” policy on a 
flight when he could not make purchases because he did not have a 
debit or credit card.92 The passenger challenged the practice, in part, 
under the Coinage Act.93 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Jersey rejected his challenge under the Federal Coinage Act and 
stated that the Act “provides nothing more than a definition of legal 
tender” and “does not create a cause of action.”94 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Erdberg v. On Line Info. Servs., Inc., No. 12-CV-3883, 2013 WL 5570062, at *13–15 (N.D. Ala. 
Oct. 9, 2013) (challenging the court’s mandatory e-filing policy for all attorneys in civil matters); 
Martinez v. Mattern, No. H-05-3237, 2006 WL 1295571, at *13–14 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2006) 
(challenging a water utility’s no-cash policy). 
 90. 140 Misc. 2d 369, 369–70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (finding reasonable the New York City Transit 
Authority’s decision to limit the acceptance of cash to locations where its employees, with appropriate 
safeguards, could issue tickets). 
 91. Id. at 370. 
 92. Civ. No. 10-5859, 2011 WL 1467209, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011), aff’d, 62 A.3d 321 (N.J. 
Super. Cit. App. Div. 2013) (stating that the plaintiff was unable to purchase a headset and cocktail on a 
flight because he did not possess a debit or credit card and the airline had a no-cash cabin policy). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. The plaintiff also attempted to bring a class action claim on behalf of all low-income 
individuals and unaccompanied minors that have traveled on Continental flights because the cashless 
policy denied them the opportunity to purchase amenities on those flights. Id. Since the plaintiff was not 
a member of either of those classes, he did not have standing as a representative of the class, and his 
claim was denied. Id. 
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B. Constitutional Challenges 
In addition to challenging cashless policies under the Coinage Act, 
several cases have raised equal protection claims.95 In Erdberg v. On 
Line Information Services, for instance, the plaintiff challenged the 
Supreme Court of Alabama’s mandatory e-filing policy as violating 
equal protection.96 The court rejected the equal protection claim 
because the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that he was treated 
disparately from other “similarly situated” persons.97 Although the 
plaintiff alleged that the policy violated his fundamental right of 
access to the courts, the court found that what was actually at issue 
was the additional fee imposed on civil attorneys, thus subjecting the 
policy to only a rational basis review.98 
Currently, a court will uphold legislative actions that burden poor 
persons as a class under the Equal Protection Clause if the actions 
have any rational relationship to a legitimate end of government.99 In 
the absence of infringement on some fundamental right or interest, a 
classification that operates to disadvantage the poor is not suspect.100 
In such circumstances, a court will use the traditional rational basis 
standard of review.101 
 
 95. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mattern, No. H-05-3237, 2006 WL 1295571, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 
2006) (upholding a water utility’s no-cash policy and finding that the utility had a legitimate 
governmental interest in protecting the funds it received in payment for water services where the 
implementation of the water utility’s policy followed a robbery and where the court found that the 
policy was rationally related to that interest). 
 96. No. 12-CV-3883, 2013 WL 5570062, at *13–15 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2013). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at *4. 
 99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43; Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: 
When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2071–72 (2015) (“Rational-basis review, the 
most deferential form of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, rarely invalidates legislation. 
Between the 1971 and 2014 Terms, the Supreme Court has held laws violative of equal protection under 
rational-basis scrutiny only seventeen times, out of over one hundred challenges analyzed under 
rational-basis scrutiny.”). 
 100. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental 
constitutional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that 
disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’”). 
 101. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43. 
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To move from a rational basis review to a strict scrutiny standard 
on legislation that disadvantages the poor, such as permitting retailers 
and other entities to implement cashless policies, the U.S. Supreme 
Court would likely have to recognize the poor as a suspect class. In 
determining whether a group should be considered a suspect class, a 
court will look at whether the person is a “discrete and insular 
minorit[y].”102 The Supreme Court considers several factors in 
determining whether a group should be classified as a suspect 
class.103 First, the Court assesses whether the group has suffered 
historical discrimination.104 Second, the Court evaluates whether the 
group “exhibit[s] obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”105 Third, the 
Court considers whether the group is politically powerless.106 Fourth, 
the Court determines whether the classifying trait—here, wealth—is 
relevant to the group’s ability to contribute to society.107 The poor 
meet the last criterion because a person’s wealth does not necessarily 
govern an individual’s ability to contribute to society.108 Thus, this 
Note focuses its analysis on the first three factors. 
1. Historical Discrimination 
If a group has historically faced discrimination, the Court may find 
that they fall into a suspect classification.109 However, the Court has 
 
 102. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
 103. Maurice R. Dyson, Rethinking Rodriguez After Citizens United: The Poor As a Suspect Class in 
High-Poverty Schools, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2016). 
 104. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (applying the suspect classification 
analysis to sex discrimination). 
 105. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that a challenge to a statute that 
distinguished parents, children, and siblings in determining eligibility for food stamps met the rational 
basis review and that parents, children, and siblings were not a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the 
Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 333, 343 (2016). 
 108. Id. at 344. 
 109. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (outlining the “traditional 
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not set forth precise criteria for finding historic abuse such as the 
amount, type, or recentness of past discrimination.110 Without precise 
guidelines, courts have relied on comparing the discriminatory 
history of the group to the experiences of African Americans or 
women.111 
Impoverished persons have faced discrimination throughout 
American history, much of which continues today.112 For instance, 
various laws throughout U.S. history have prohibited vagrancy.113 
Laws, such as prohibitions against panhandling or restrictions on 
sleeping or bathing in public, have been used against those living in 
poverty.114 
A report analyzing the laws in over a hundred cities and 
metropolitan areas throughout the United States found that in 2016 
47% of cities prohibited sitting and lying down in public, 32% 
outlawed loitering citywide, and 6% restricted food sharing.115 
Compared to a decade earlier, there were nearly twice as many 
citywide camping and loitering bans and more than twice as many 
bans against living in vehicles.116 People living in poor 
neighborhoods are more likely to be the target of police harassment, 
brutality, and killings than those in affluent areas.117 Although 
advocates for the homeless population have mounted challenges to 
anti-homeless laws by arguing that these laws violate the First, 
 
indicia of suspectness,” which includes a history of purposeful unequal treatment). 
 110. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces 
of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 981 (1975). 
 111. Strauss, supra note 41, at 151. 
 112. Id. at 140. 
 113. Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 
88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 523 (2003) (“History reveals discrimination against homeless persons began in 
the fourteenth century; this discrimination continues to confront the homeless today.”). 
 114. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 353–56 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 903 
F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), for the historical treatment of begging. 
 115. Trevor Bach, Will Fines and Jail Time Fix the Homelessness Crisis?, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 7, 2019, 
1:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-10-07/us-cities-are-increasingly-cracking-
down-on-homelessness; NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS 
2019: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 56 (2019) [hereinafter HOUSING 
NOT HANDCUFFS], http://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUSING-NOT-HANDCUFFS-2019-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB22-KCRZ]. 
 116. Bach, supra note 115. 
 117. Dyson, supra note 103, at 28. 
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Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, only some of the 
challenges have been successful.118 
Before the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964, 
poll taxes were used to disenfranchise poor voters.119 The 
Amendment prohibits both Congress and the states from conditioning 
the right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other 
types of taxes.120 Even today, voter identification laws are being used 
as a tool to disenfranchise poor voters.121 
2. Immutable Trait 
Members of a suspect class often share an immutable trait.122 
However, the Court has not articulated a clear, definitive definition of 
immutability.123 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court defined an 
immutable trait as a “characteristic determined solely by the accident 
of birth.”124 Some courts have expanded the definition, and now 
immutability depends on whether the trait is difficult to change.125 
The trait may be difficult to change because it is out of a person’s 
 
 118. Joanna Laine, From Criminalization to Humanization: Ending Discrimination Against the 
Homeless, 39 HARBINGER 1, 4 (2015). 
 119. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s 
requirement of the payment of a poll tax to vote in state elections), overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any 
primary or other election . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason 
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”). 
 121. Sari Horwitz, Getting a Photo ID So You Can Vote Is Easy. Unless You’re Poor, Black, Latino 
or Elderly, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/getting-
a-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec-
20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html [https://perma.cc/7SB8-YRCX] (“[M]any election experts 
say that the process for obtaining a photo ID can be far more difficult than it looks for hundreds of 
thousands of people across the country who do not have the required photo identification cards. Those 
most likely to be affected are elderly citizens, African Americans, Hispanics and low-income 
residents.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Examples of immutable traits are a 
person’s sex, race, or national origin. Id. 
 123. Strauss, supra note 41, at 162. 
 124. 411 U.S. at 688, 690–91 (finding that the differential treatment of male and female military 
personnel for purposes of determining dependent benefits was unconstitutional because “classifications 
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, 
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny”). 
 125. Strauss, supra note 41, at 162. 
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control or because to change the trait would require too high of a 
cost.126 
The official poverty rate in 2018 was 11.8%.127 The number of 
people in poverty in 2018 was 38.1 million.128 Every year, the U.S. 
Census Bureau uses a set of dollar value thresholds that vary by 
family size and composition to determine who is in poverty.129 In 
2018, for example, the poverty threshold for a family of four was an 
annual income of $26,324.130 
Although poverty is not a completely immutable trait, it is 
something one is born into and can be difficult to change.131 The 
likelihood of escaping poverty for a child born into impoverished 
conditions is low.132 Income mobility varies across the country, 
depending on where a child grows up.133 Children in parts of the 
Midwest, the Northeast, and the West have greater chances of 
upward mobility.134 However, the likelihood of escaping poverty for 
children in the South and portions of the Rust Belt is much lower.135 
For example, a child born in Atlanta, Georgia, or Charlotte, North 
Carolina, into a household making less than $25,000 a year has only 
a 4% chance to move into the upper 20% of income strata over a 
lifetime.136 A family’s wealth is more likely to impact whether a 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018: U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU 1 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-
266.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD2E-WH9U]. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 49. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Christina Pazzanese, The Costs of Inequality: Increasingly, It’s the Rich and the Rest, HARV. 
GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2016), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-costs-of-inequality-
increasingly-its-the-rich-and-the-rest [https://perma.cc/8CGW-ST8K]. 
 132. Id.; Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Lower Rungs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-americans-to-rise-from-lower-rungs.html 
[https://perma.cc/V6RE-XDCY] (“A project . . . found that 42 percent of American men raised in the 
bottom fifth of incomes stay there as adults. . . . Meanwhile, just 8 percent of American men at the 
bottom rose to the top fifth.”). 
 133. Pazzanese, supra note 131. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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person can pursue an education or a high-paying job.137 Those living 
in poverty often live in resource-poor communities with subpar 
schools, limited social connections, and limited opportunities to 
secure a higher education.138 
3. Lack of Political Power 
In determining whether a suspect classification is warranted, the 
Court also reviews whether the group was powerless to protect 
themselves via the political process.139 Two different approaches to 
measuring political power have emerged.140 The first is the 
descriptive representation approach, which focuses on the extent to 
which the group’s members occupy political offices.141 The second 
approach focuses on whether a group has benefited from favorable 
legislation or executive action.142 
From a descriptive representation approach, poor people are 
underrepresented in politics.143 Though working-class jobs (defined 
as manual labor, service industry positions, and clerical jobs) make 
up more than half of the economy in the United States, politicians 
from the working-class make up less than 3% of the average state 
legislature.144 On a national level, the average member of Congress 
spent less than 2% of their career in working-class positions.145 
 
 137. BARADARAN, supra note 78, at 250. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 325; Bertrall L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE 
L.J. 1807, 1817 (2017) (“Justices ultimately justified the denial of suspect-class status to new groups in 
part on the basis . . . that such groups have sufficient political power to defend themselves in the 
political process. This determination, however, has been based on an unsubstantiated and undefended 
measure of political power that was designed to exclude all groups from special protection.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 140. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 326. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Nicholas Carnes, Working-Class People Are Underrepresented in Politics. The Problem Isn’t 
Voters, VOX (Oct. 24, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/10/24/18009856/working-class-income-inequality-randy-bryce-alexandria-ocasio-cortez 
[https://perma.cc/Q6K9-KPDL]. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (“The exclusion of working-class people from American political institutions isn’t a recent 
phenomenon.”); Nicholas Carnes, Why Are So Few US Politicians from the Working Class?, THE 
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From a favorable legislation approach, a stronger case can be made 
that the poor have political power, but it is uncertain whether the 
legislation is in response to political influence of the poor or for other 
reasons.146 There are several federal and state laws and programs that 
are targeted at assisting low-income residents.147 The Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides food-purchasing 
assistance to low-income people.148 Several programs assist 
low-income children and families, such as Head Start, which 
provides early childhood education, health, and nutrition services.149 
More recently, the expansion of Medicaid and increased minimum 
wage across several states work to help lower-income people.150 On 
the other hand, as discussed supra, state and local governments 
continue to pass legislation targeted at homeless people and 
lower-income residents.151 
Participation in the political process, particularly the ability to 
vote, is also limited for the poor.152 At least twenty-four states have 
implemented laws aimed at restricting voting since 2010.153 Several 
 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/commentisfree/2018/oct/04/few-us-politicians-working-class [https://perma.cc/Z6TG-LFK3] (“In 
nationwide surveys of people campaigning for state legislatures in 2012 and 2014, candidates from 
working-class jobs made up just 4% of both Republican and Democratic candidates.”). 
 146. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 328 (“Recent social science studies of political inequality provide 
strong evidence that the poor lack political power, as defined by elected officials’ and legislatures’ 
responsiveness to the group’s preferences on an array of social, economic, and foreign policy issues, 
calling into question the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the passage of favorable legislation.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See generally Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: FOOD & 
NUTRITION SERV., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program 
[https://perma.cc/C5B7-JAYY]. 
 149. Head Start Services, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS. (Nov. 3, 
2020), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ohs/about/head-start [https://perma.cc/G8SY-XPZC]. 
 150. Benjamin D. Sommers & Donald Oellerich, The Poverty-Reducing Effect of Medicaid, 32 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 816, 829 (2013) (“Medicaid and [the Children’s Health Insurance Program] play a 
significant role in poverty reduction for millions of Americans, in all age groups. Beyond the program’s 
presumed primary benefit of improved access to care and health, . . . Medicaid has significant poverty 
reducing effects of a similar order of magnitude as other dedicated anti-poverty government 
programs.”). 
 151. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 115, at 77. 
 152. Jordan Malter, Why Poor People Still Aren’t Voting, CNN BUSINESS (Aug. 5, 2015, 10:02 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/05/news/economy/poor-people-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/HRX9-
EPS7]. 
 153. Terry Gross, Republican Voter Suppression Efforts Are Targeting Minorities, Journalist Says, 
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states have enacted stricter voter identification laws, which on the 
face appear to be neutral, but poor people are more likely to lack the 
identification necessary to vote.154 The U.S. Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to invalidate voter identification laws, reasoning that the 
state’s interest in preventing voter fraud outweighs the burdens 
placed on voters.155 Other factors, such as poll closings or reductions 
in election staff, have led to other barriers such as long lines and 
limited polling hours.156 These barriers have a disproportionate 
impact on the poor who face insecure employment or inflexible work 
schedules.157 In the 2018 election, the most common reason cited for 
not voting by those with a family income of less than $20,000 was 
“[t]oo busy, conflicting schedule.”158 As a result, the poor’s 
participation in voting is diminished, and the poor would likely be 
considered a group with little to no political power.159 
III. PROPOSAL 
There are two possible approaches to protect the impoverished and 
their ability to use cash in financial transactions. First, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should classify poverty as a suspect class and apply 
strict scrutiny to any legislation that impacts their ability to 
 
NPR (Oct. 23, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659784277/republican-voter-
suppression-efforts-are-targeting-minorities-journalist-says [https://perma.cc/TVP9-B9RJ]. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008). In his dissent, Justice Souter 
pointed out that an estimated 43,000 Indiana citizens lacked the proper identification to be able to vote, 
and it would require spending anywhere from $3 to $100 to obtain the requisite documentation, in 
addition to travel costs associated with completing the process. Id. at 215–19 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 156. Anna North, Why Long Lines at Polling Places Are a Voting Rights Issue, VOX (Nov. 6, 2018, 
4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/6/18068506/midterm-election-voting-lines-new-york-georgia 
(“In urban counties where a majority of voters are people of color, voters lost an average of seven 
polling places and more than 200 poll workers, according to USA Today. Meanwhile, in counties where 
more than 90 percent of the population was white, voters lost just two locations and two workers on 
average during that time period.”). 
 157. Id. (“[C]losures have a disproportionate impact on poor voters or those with insecure 
employment or inflexible work schedules, many of whom are people of color.”). 
 158. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2018, at 
tbl.10 (2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-
583.html [https://perma.cc/UV24-FACN]. 
 159. North, supra note 156. 
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participate in the marketplace freely.160 Second, Congress should 
enact federal legislation to prohibit cashless policies to put a stop to 
the practice because cashless policies discriminate against those who 
do not have access to banking and financial institutions.161 
A. Classifying Poverty As a Suspect Class 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s current laissez-faire review of 
legislation impacting the impoverished has left little protection for 
those who need it.162 The lack of strict scrutiny has allowed a climate 
of scapegoating, stereotyping, and stigmatization against the poor to 
continue.163 Some argue that government policies, such as criminal 
justice policies, decisions about funding for education, and policies 
related to housing, contribute to the intensification and persistence of 
poverty.164 
Some scholars argue that the judiciary is the most effective branch 
for making decisions regarding fundamental rights, including the 
rights of the poor.165 Courts are not hindered by the same time 
constraints and media influence as the legislature and can deliberate 
on complex issues.166 Courts are also more likely to have expertise in 
deciding fundamental rights questions.167 With the protection of 
 
 160. Rebecca Bellan, As More Cities Ban Cashless Businesses, New York Wants to Follow, 
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Mar. 6, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/cashless-
cash-free-ban-bill-new-york-retail-discrimination/584203 [https://perma.cc/2WTL-NYRQ] (“Cashless 
institutions encourage a FinTech Jim Crow by restricting the places where people of color can shop, eat, 
and receive basic services . . . .” (quoting Edgard Laborde, deputy political director of the Retail 
Wholesale Department Store Union)). 
 161. Kim, supra note 17 (“Barriers to banking and technology may deny portions of the population 
access to basic goods and services . . . . Others may not have the access, finances or skills to acquire 
formal banking services or a smartphone, or simply do not like banks.”). 
 162. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1277, 
1285 (1993). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 45 (1987); Michael Tanner, How the Government Helps Keep People Poor, N.Y. 
POST, https://nypost.com/2018/12/05/how-the-government-helps-keep-people-poor 
[https://perma.cc/FP3G-K9CF] (Dec. 5, 2018, 7:46 PM). 
 165. DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 119 (2007). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 122–23. 
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lifetime tenure, the judicial branch does not face the same pressures 
as legislatures to make decisions favoring the majority opinion and is 
thus able to protect the interests of all citizens.168 
Once the Court establishes the poor as a suspect classification, any 
government classification included in legislation or related to a state 
action that disfavors the poor may be challenged on equal protection 
grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment.169 The Government 
would then carry the burden of showing that the classification is 
necessary and narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest of 
the State.170 A change in the classification of the poor as a suspect 
class must come from the judicial system because the classification 
hinges on judicial interpretation of the Constitution.171 
Despite the ability to recognize the poor as a suspect class, the 
U.S. Supreme Court is not likely to do so for a variety of reasons.172 
Since the 1970s, the Court has been reluctant to apply any form of 
heightened scrutiny to wealth discrimination cases.173 In fact, since 
the Court announced a standard for determining which classes are 
suspect under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not deemed 
a new class as suspect.174 The Court declined to extend the suspect 
classification to groups such as the elderly, the disabled, and the 
poor.175 
 
 168. Id. at 124–25. 
 169. Dyson, supra note 103, at 8. 
 170. Id. 
 171. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 586 (“In a very famous footnote in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., the Supreme Court articulated the idea that different constitutional claims would be 
subjected to varying levels of review.”). 
 172. Ross, supra note 139, at 1815. 
 173. Id. at 1814 (“Many legal scholars claim that the suspect-class doctrine is dead. It has been over 
forty years since the Court recognized a new suspect class, a determination that triggers heightened 
scrutiny of laws that discriminate against the class and creates a presumption of unconstitutionality for 
those laws.”). 
 174. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 325; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481, 485 (2004) (“The Court did not articulate detailed indicia for discerning which classifications 
should fill this set until the early 1970s—decades after it first referred to race as a suspect classification. 
Almost immediately, the ‘set’ closed when a majority of the Court accorded sex-based classifications 
quasi-suspect status. It has not expanded since.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 175. Goldberg, supra note 174; Ross, supra note 139, at 1814–15 (“[T]he Supreme Court has denied 
or avoided deciding claims of entitlement to suspect-class protection by the poor, the elderly, the 
disabled, and the LGBTQ community.”). 
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Although the Court’s reasoning is unknown, scholars have 
hypothesized several reasons why the Court may be hesitant to 
extend suspect classifications. First, the Court may be reluctant to 
extend special protection to too many groups.176 One fear is that the 
Court may intervene too frequently in the political process and 
require even more intervention.177 Judges are reluctant to 
second-guess decisions made by the legislatures when it comes to 
economic and social policy choices.178 
Second, the Court may have embraced the originalist view of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and intended only to protect African 
Americans.179 Under this interpretation, no other groups would be 
entitled to protection under the Equal Protection Clause.180 
Supporters of the originalist view argue that the Court has used the 
Fourteenth Amendment to assume power under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation, which was not the original intention.181 
Third, there may be a fear that protecting the poor as a suspect 
class may have further implications, such as creating a constitutional 
right to government benefits like welfare, food, shelter, or medical 
 
 176. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his 
dissent in Sugarman, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that the classification of minorities would 
become too broad:  
Our society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins, 
customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly 
take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find “insular and discrete” minorities at 
every turn in the road. Yet, unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally 
justify both the terms and analysis it uses, these decisions today stand for the 
proposition that the Court can choose a “minority” it “feels” deserves “solicitude” 
and thereafter prohibit the States from classifying that “minority” differently from the 
“majority.” 
Id. 
 177. Ross, supra note 139, at 1813. 
 178. Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People from Equal Constitutional 
Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2012); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) 
(“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.”). 
 179. Ross, supra note 139, at 1815; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 752–53 (“[T]he initial Supreme 
Court decisions construing the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause suggested that it could be used only to 
protect [B]lacks.”). 
 180. Ross, supra note 139, at 1815. 
 181. Johnathan G. O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253, 
264 (2001). 
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care.182 If the Court treats wealth as a suspect class, lower courts will 
adhere to precedent and will scrutinize laws that discriminate against 
the group in other contexts.183 The broad application of the suspect 
classification to other contexts may deter the Court from acting and 
providing special judicial protection to the poor.184 The Court may 
also be reluctant to overrule precedent with respect to extending 
suspect classification to the poor.185 Despite the unlikelihood of the 
Court recognizing the poor as a suspect class, the Court should 
rectify the past decisions and provide the poor greater constitutional 
protection. 
B. Enacting Federal Legislation 
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to recognize the poor as a 
suspect class, Congress should enact federal legislation targeted at 
prohibiting cashless retailers under the Commerce Clause power—
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.186 Federal 
legislation enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause power would 
restrict private businesses’ abilities to establish cashless policies but 
would not limit such restrictions to federal and state actions. 
Federal legislation is preferable to address the problem to ensure 
consistency and alleviate the need for state and local governments to 
enact legislation. Congress should recognize that allowing retailers to 
establish no-cash policies restricts the ability of consumers who are 
unbanked or underbanked from participating fully in the economy.187 
 
 182. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43. 
 183. Ross, supra note 139, at 1835. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 342 (“In the early 1970s, the Court decided the case of San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which would serve as the foundation for the Court’s 
eventual denial of suspect class status to the poor. The irony is that while the Court would later cite 
Rodriguez to support its denial of suspect class status to the poor, the Court never actually decided the 
question in the case.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 187. Bourke et al., supra note 12 (“Cash made up nearly 40 percent of in-person transactions in 2017, 
according to the Federal Reserve, and, although its usage continues to decline, cash is still the most 
widely used payment type.”).  
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The federal legislation would help impoverished consumers preserve 
their freedom of consumer choice.188 
To effectively preserve consumer choice, federal legislation should 
incorporate several key terms already enacted or proposed by state 
and local legislators. First, there should be an overall ban on refusing 
to accept cash with a limited number of exceptions.189 The primary 
exception should be to exempt online retailers and transactions 
completed over the telephone or through the mail. Ideally, the 
legislation should mirror Rhode Island’s cash payment bill, which 
simply states: “All retail establishments shall accept legal tender 
currency when offered as payment. Provided, the provisions of this 
section shall not apply to online purchases or sales made over the 
internet.”190 The legislation should focus on brick-and-mortar 
retailers, defined as any place of business operating at a fixed, 
permanent physical premises.191 
Second, retailers should be prohibited from posting notices stating 
that cash is not accepted or discouraging potential customers from 
using cash during the transaction.192 Even if the retailer ultimately 
does accept cash, a sign discouraging the use of cash defeats the 
purpose of the cashless policy prohibition. Third, retailers should be 
prohibited from charging higher prices to those customers who 
choose to pay with cash.193 Although charging a higher fee for paying 
cash is not a typical practice currently, it could become an issue in 
the future as the cashless movement grows if a retailer is attempting 
 
 188. Id. (“Millions of consumers rely on cash to make purchases, either by necessity or by choice.”). 
 189. See, e.g., PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1132(1) (2019) (“A person selling or offering for sale goods or 
services at retail is prohibited from refusing to accept cash as a form of payment to purchase goods or 
services.”). 
 190. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-30 (2019). 
 191. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 55, § 5502 (2019) (“‘Brick-and-Mortar Business’ means any place 
of business operating at a fixed, permanent physical premises. Brick-and-Mortar Business does not 
include any business not operating at a physical premises in San Francisco (one example being a 
business operating in the City exclusively via the Internet without any physical premises in the 
City) . . . .”). 
 192. PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1132(1)(b) (“A person selling or offering for sale goods or services at 
retail shall not . . . [p]ost signs on the premises that cash payment is not accepted . . . .”). 
 193. Id. § 9-1132(1)(c) (“A person selling or offering for sale goods or services at retail shall 
not . . . [c]harge a higher price to customers who pay cash than they would pay using any other form of 
payment.”). 
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to discourage the use of cash. Some retailers add surcharges for 
customers using a credit card for purchases.194 Although retailers 
have the right to add surcharges to transactions when a customer is 
paying with a credit card, ten states have enacted regulations 
prohibiting retailers from imposing a surcharge on the buyer for 
using a credit card in lieu of payment by cash.195 
Federal legislation, rather than state laws or local ordinances, will 
overcome jurisdictional issues that prevent state and local legislation 
from reaching certain businesses. For example, the Airline 
Deregulation Act includes language that makes airlines’ policy 
decisions related to a price, route, or service immune to state laws.196 
A federally enacted law will also trump any state and local 
ordinances that contradict the federal legislation and ensure 
consumers, particularly poor consumers, are treated consistently 
across the country.197 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should primarily handle 
enforcement of the federal statute.198 The FTC is a bipartisan federal 
agency with a dual mission of protecting consumers and promoting 
competition.199 The FTC is divided into three bureaus: the Bureau of 
 
 194. Justin Pritchard, Credit Card Surcharges: Why It Can Cost More to Use Credit, THE BALANCE 
(Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/credit-card-surcharges-315423 [https://perma.cc/A7S8-
D2UL] (“If merchants decide to use credit card surcharges, they must: [c]learly disclose the fact that 
there is a surcharge to you before the transaction[,] [d]isplay the credit card surcharge on the receipt[,] 
[and] [k]eep surcharges below 4% of the transaction, or the amount of fees the merchant pays to the 
credit card companies, whichever is less.” (emphasis added)). 
 195. See CAL CIV. CODE § 1748.1(a) (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-212(1) (2019); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 42-133ff(a) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-403 (2010); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140D, § 28A (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-509 (2011); N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-417 (2019); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 604A.0021 (West 2017). 
 196. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (“Except as provided in this subsection, a State, 
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least [two] States may not enact or enforce a 
law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service 
of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.”). 
 197. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 198. Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/AB3Z-NY49] (“The Federal Trade Commission was created on September 26, 1914, 
when President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Trade Commission Act into law.”). 
 199. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do 
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Consumer Protection, the Bureau of Competition, and the Bureau of 
Economics.200 The cashless ban would fall into similar consumer 
protection statutes that the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection 
currently enforces, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
which prohibits deceptive, unfair, and abusive debt collection 
practices.201 
FTC investigations can be initiated in several ways.202 An 
investigation may stem from a consumer complaint made directly to 
the FTC, from a business alerting the FTC to a practice of one of 
their competitors, from a member of Congress forwarding the 
complaint from a constituent, or from the direct observations of FTC 
employees during their interactions with a business.203 Following an 
investigation, if the FTC has “reason to believe” that a law has been 
violated, the FTC may initiate an enforcement action through either 
an administrative or judicial process.204 
Penalties for non-compliance should mirror New Jersey’s law, 
which prohibits a retailer from requiring a buyer to pay using credit 
or to prohibit cash as payment to purchase the goods or services.205 A 
person in violation of the law would be subject to a civil penalty of 
up to $2,500 for a first offense and up to $5,000 for a second 
offense.206 These penalties would make most businesses think twice 
before violating the law because the cost of multiple violations would 
far outweigh the costs associated with facilitating cash transactions. 
 
[https://perma.cc/96U3-LKAP]. 
 200. CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW & POLICY 90 (2016); see 
also Federal Trade Commission, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Federal-Trade-
Commission [https://perma.cc/5C9T-CJ62]. 
 201. Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes [https://perma.cc/2Q6D-KD4B] (“The Commission has 
enforcement or administrative responsibilities under more than 70 laws.”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p. 
 202. 16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (“A complaint or request for Commission action may be submitted via the 
Commission’s web-based complaint site . . . by a telephone call . . . or by a signed statement setting 
forth the alleged violation of law with such supporting information as is available . . . .”). 
 203. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 200, at 103. 
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The CASH Act, one of the bills recently proposed in Congress, 
closely aligns with the suggested provisions. The CASH Act states 
that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any physical retail establishment to 
refuse to accept legal tender as payment for any products or services 
offered for sale.”207 Online and telephone transactions are exempt 
from the compliance in the proposed bill. The CASH Act designates 
enforcement to the FTC and classifies the practice as an “unfair or 
deceptive act, or practice,” and allows for the FTC to promulgate 
regulations to implement enforcement of the bill.208 
CONCLUSION 
If the current trend of businesses instituting cashless policies gains 
momentum, the impact on the poor will be devastating.209 Many 
impoverished people are unbanked and underbanked and lack access 
to banking and financial institutions.210 Without judicial and 
legislative intervention, those lacking access to banks will be shut out 
of the economy. Judicial intervention in the form of recognition of 
the poor as a suspect class is necessary to protect the poor.211 A 
suspect classification will protect the poor from state and local laws 
that limit their ability to transact with the government and 
government agencies.212 In addition, federal legislation is necessary 
to ensure that private businesses engaged in interstate commerce are 
also prohibited from implementing no-cash policies.213 Congress 
should proactively ensure the poor’s protection and ability to 
participate in the marketplace. 
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